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This dissertation contributes to the economics literature by demonstrating the relative
ease with which we can use the directed search model to shed some light on the behav-
ior of heterogeneous agents whose decisions depend on expected outcomes in two-sided
frictional markets. The three chapters in this dissertation answer questions related to
selection into frictional labor and marriage markets.
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0.1 Introduction
Early work in search theory such as McCall(1970) and Weitzman (1978) to models
with two sided search by Nobel Prize winners Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and
Pissarides (1984) led to vast improvements in the way researchers deal with frictional
markets. Despite success in explicitly modelling search frictions, the matching tech-
nology in these earlier models is a "black-box" (Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005 ).
In random search models, the matching frequency is independent of the sharing rule
and so the equilibrium may be ine¢ cient since it does not internalize externalities in
the search process (Hosios 1990). Hosios (1990) introduced what is now known as the
"Hosios condition" showing that the matching outcomes are e¢ cient if the sharing rule
depends on the elasticity of the matching function. It is important to de￿ne e¢ ciency
in this context: for the equilibrium to be e¢ cient, a ￿rm￿ s value in equilibrium must be
equal to its social value. Work by Montgomery (1991) and later work by Shimer (1996,
1999) and Moen (1997), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) were remarkable in providing
the intuition for the e¢ ciency result implied by the combination of wage posting and
directed search.
When modelling decisions ex-ante and ex-post the matching process, a hold up prob-
lem can arise if agents on each side of the market do not take into account decisions on
the other side of the market. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that no hold-up prob-
lem arises and the equilibrium is unique and e¢ cient when wage posting allows workers
to direct their search. The intuition is simple: in competitive markets, agents areviii
surplus maximizing and so given the availability of ex-ante information and full commit-
ment, ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to o⁄er contracts that maximize the sum of expected utilities
from match formation, thus the contracts are bilaterally e¢ cient (Menzio, Telyukova
and Visschers, 2012). In this dissertation I use the directed search framework to answer
questions related to marriage markets and self-selection into labor markets. Following
a long tradition in the economics literature, I use the plural even though my work is
single authored.
Chapter 1 extends the directed search model to include e¢ cient ex-ante investments
in schooling to pin down unobserved changes in the marriage surplus that are consistent
with the gender reversal in college completion. In the US, women are now more likely
to invest in education than men compared to birth cohorts from the ￿rst half of the 20th
century. Since a long line of published economic literature has concluded that there
are returns to schooling in the marriage market (Chiappori et al. 2008) and that search
is directed in the marriage market (Greenwood, Guner et al. 2012), our model seems
appropriate to study these decisions. The model suggests that the surplus decreased
for less educated women relative to college educated women irrespective of whom they
marry causing the marital college premium to increase for women but not for men.
Chapter 2 extends the model to include divorce risk to investigate the e⁄ect of divorce
laws on the marriage surplus. Although it remains a challenge to reconcile declining
marriage rates as a result of a decrease in divorce costs, our approach provides a simple
blueprint for future research when trying to solve the puzzle of how to reconcile a model
of marriage with transferable utility where increased divorce risk leads to a decrease in0.1. INTRODUCTION ix
marriage rates. Taking divorce risk as given, the e⁄ect of divorce on the value of match
speci￿c investments is consistent with a decrease in marriage rates as observed in the
data.
Chapter 3 introduces a model of self￿ selection, costly legal status and search in the
labor market. In this paper, we model job search and temporary migration with human
capital investments to explain labor market outcomes of migrant workers. We decompose
the legal status decision into the e⁄ect of expected labor market outcomes and that of
migration costs. Legal status is costly which partly explains why high skilled workers
are more likely to become documented workers. Using the model calibrated to match
outcomes both during and after the migration spell, we ￿nd that documented migrants
are more likely to invest in new skills however it is low skilled workers who are more
likely to invest than the high skilled. High skilled workers have higher gains from work
abroad but when workers must return, the gains from investments are greater for low
skilled workers. Temporary migration provides an opportunity for less skilled workers
to catch-up to high skilled workers who return. Our simple framework contributes to
the Brain Gain/Drain discussion.xChapter 1
The Gender Reversal in College
Completion
ABSTRACT - Women are now more likely to invest in education than men compared
to birth cohorts from the ￿rst half of the 20th century. Using a directed search model of
marriage with endogenous pre-marital investments in schooling, we document changes
in the marriage surplus that are consistent with a gender reversal in college attainment
as observed in the US data. The model suggests that the marriage surplus decreased
more for less educated women relative to college educated women irrespective of who
they marry causing the marital college premium to increase for women but not for men.
12 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
1.1 Introduction
The decline of marriage rates, the rise in positive assortative matching and the gender
reversal in college completion in the US is well documented. At ￿rst glance, it may
seem challenging to explain why women whose market returns are still lower than men
would overtake men in college completion, however contributions in this literature have
suggested that education yields returns in the marriage market. Chiappori, Iyigun
and Weiss (2009) suggest that if labor market returns rise and household production
demands less time, more women will invest in education than men. The underlying
assumption is that all household work was done by women in the past and that the
modern woman is likely to spend more time in the labor market. There is a large body
of literature that shows that when women￿ s schooling premia increases, women spend
less time involved in household work and men make up the slack. Galor and Weil (1996)
argue that technological progress in the market sector led to a change in the nature of
jobs that was favorable to women￿ s participation. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu
(2005) suggests that improvements in household technology and a decline in the price of
household equipment are also partly responsible for the "liberation" of women. While
the growing wage premia, the advancements in technology and the decline in the price
of household equipment are among the shifts driving the education trends for both men
and women, these shifts alone cannot provide an explanation for why women overtake
men in college completion.
Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos (2012) provide a theory that is excellent1.1. INTRODUCTION 3
at matching many key empirical facts such as the fraction of ever married, ever divorced,
and sorting patterns to explain the role of technological progress and wages on female
labor-force participation. However, despite ex-ante asymmetry between men and women
in their model such as making the assumption that only women provide the time inputs
required in the production of the household good, their model fails to yield the reversal
in college attainment of men and women.
In this paper, we build a model of e¢ cient investments in schooling and marriage to
ask: what is the education speci￿c marriage surplus that is consistent with the gender
reversal in college completion? Our contribution is to quantify the surplus that is
consistent with data observations in order to guide future research on this topic. Given
wages of men and women, we can decompose the observed attainment in schooling of men
and women into the e⁄ect of labor market returns to education and that of the marital
college premium. Assuming that household utility depends on observed total household
income and the unobserved value of non-market goods generated in a marriage, we can
then compare the surplus from the old regime where more men invest in education than
women from the surplus in the new regime where women are more likely to invest than
men. We ￿nd that the value of non-market goods i.e. the surplus decreased for women
with no college education relative to college educated women regardless of their spouse
education.
The mechanism underlying the marriage market is directed search. Random search
models with heterogenous agents assume that workers have no information about jobs
and must randomly look for them. Although there was very little theoretical reason to4 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
prefer one over the other up until now, random search is so unlike what we observe in
the real world in the sense that "marriages aren￿ t just accidents". Greenwood, Guner,
Kocharkov and Santos (2012) empirical analysis shows that search is directed in the
marriage market. In addition, investments ex-ante or ex-post the matching process are
not subject to a hold-up problem in our framework (see Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
The model is parameterized to match ￿ ows into marriage for two cohorts. Taking
a snapshot of the marriage market in 1958 and then again in 1998, our results suggests
that a decrease in the surplus for married women with no college education relative to
college educated women (regardless of their spouse education) can explain the gender
reversal in education.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses stylized facts about
education and marriage. Section 3 introduces the model and de￿nes the equilibrium.
Section 4 provides an application of the theory. In Section 5, we determine the values
of each type of household given observed marriage ￿ ows and wages of men and women.
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Background and Stylized Facts
The changing relationship between education and marriage in the United States is well
documented. Once barriers to female careers were lowered, combined with technological
progress in the production of household goods as well as improvements in contraceptive
technology (Knowles, 2002, 2007), females started to surpass males in college completion
(see Goldin and Katz, 2002, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). The US Census includes1.2. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND AND STYLIZED FACTS 5
variables on age, educational attainment, marital status, age of ￿rst marriage as well
as spousal characteristics. Using the age of marriage and education variables, we can
observe the population of college educated men and women, we can compute the marriage
rate as well as the fraction of marriages by education type. Unlike Greenwood-Guner-
Kocharkov-Santos (GGKS, 2012) who consider the entire population of men and women
in 1960 and in 2005, we consider two speci￿c cohorts. We look at the incidence of
￿rst marriages for the 1935-1944 cohort who married in 1968 and the 1965-1974 cohort
married in 1998. These numbers can easily be obtained using the 2008 American
Community Survey. We normalize the wage rate for a non-college educated male of the
early cohort to 1. The college premium was 1.08 in 1970. This is the ratio of wages
for college educated men relative to a non-college educated men. Moving onto 2008.
Men without a college education earned 1.14 times as much as in 1970 and the college
premium in 2008 was 1.9. We de￿ne the gender gap as the ratio of women wage income
to men wage income. The gender gap was 0.59 in 1970 and 0.92 in 2008.6 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
Table 1: 2008 ACS Year Marr. 1968 Year Marr. 1998
College Educated Men (M) 0.46 0.54
College Educated Women (W) 0.37 0.61
Marriage Rate women. (Coll) 0.059 0.049
Marriage Rate women. (no-coll) 0.076 0.036
Assignment of men to women (Sorting)*
no coll (M)- no coll (W) 0.32 0.15
coll (M) - coll (W) 0.26 0.56
coll (M) - no coll (W) 0.37 0.17
no coll (M) - coll (W) 0.05 0.12
Observations 94284 191488
*# of marriages of type i;j as a fraction of the total number of marriages
Table 2: Wages 1970 2008
No Coll Men 1 1.14
Coll Men 1.08 1.23
No Coll Women 0.59 0.92
Coll Women 0.71 1.75
Gender Gap 0.59 0.92
1.3 The Model
Time is discrete. The economy is populated with two period lived agents of each
gender g 2 fM;Wg on each side of the marriage market: M for men and W for women1.3. THE MODEL 7
respectively. Schooling opportunities arrive in the ￿rst period of an agent￿ s life before
he/she gets an opportunity to enter the marriage market. College attainment is referred
to as the type throughout this paper. For simplicity, the model assumes only two types
of men and women, a high type and a low type. Let the mass of single men of type i be
￿i and that of single women of type j be ￿j . i 2 fH;Lg denotes the type where L is
the low type and H the high type, for men and j 2 fU;Dg where D is a low type and U
is a high type for women. We assume heterogenous schooling costs that are identically
and independently distributed drawn from a distribution that is symmetric around its
mean ￿. The value of investing in schooling net the schooling cost de￿nes the returns
to education. In our economy, investments in schooling depend on outcomes in the
marriage market and the distribution of the schooling costs. The marriage surplus is
de￿ned as xij = ￿ xij ￿ Ai ￿ Aj where ￿ xij is the output generated by the match, Ai and
Aj are the single values of men and women respectively.
1.3.1 The Marriage Market
On each side of the marriage market there are 2 types of men and 2 types of women.
The matching mechanism involves directed search. Women are assigned to sub-markets
where they post type speci￿c marriage o⁄ers. Potential male suitors observe these
terms of marriage and choose which sub-market to enter. Although a woman may
receive applications from many suitors of the same type, matching occurs in pairs and
she is matched with a random man of the type she hoped to attract in the queue.8 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
Matching
Each woman of type j is assigned to one of 2 sub-markets where they make a match-
speci￿c wage o⁄er !i;j so to attract a queue of suitors of type i. By committing to a
type speci￿c marriage contract, each woman is choosing a queue length where the queue
is de￿ned as the ratio of men of type i seeking to be matched with a type j woman. (the
inverse of the market tightness).
￿i;j ￿
￿i
￿j
Although each woman of type j can only be matched to one man of type i, a woman
of each type may receive more than one suitor of a given type and will choose a random
worker from the queue. The probability that a type j woman receives at least one suitor
a type i is:
q(￿i;;j) = ￿j1 ￿ e￿￿i;j
The probability, conditional on entering the marriage market, that a man of type h
gets the surplus is:
P(￿h;;j) =
q(￿h;;j)
￿h;j
=
￿j1 ￿ e￿￿h;j
￿h;;j
For type l men, they must face competition from type h men in the queue such that the
probability that a type l man gets the surplus is:
P(￿l;;j) =
q(￿l;;j)
￿l;j
=
￿je￿￿h;j1 ￿ e￿￿l;j
￿l;;j1.3. THE MODEL 9
In equilibrium, a man of type i must be indi⁄erent about which queue to enter:
(1.1) ￿(i) = P(￿i;j)!(i;j) =
q(￿i;j)
￿i;j
!(i;j)
!i;j = ￿(i)
1
P(￿i;j)
The above equation implies that a man faces a trade-o⁄between the likelihood of getting
the surplus P(￿i;j) =
q(￿i;j)
￿i;j and the value of the o⁄er !(i;j). The inverse relationship
between !(i;j) and P(￿i;j) implies that the higher the probability of getting the married,
the lower is the gain from marriage. In a submarket with low o⁄ers, the gain from being
matched is low and suitors are compensated by high arrival rates of marriage contracts.
Women maximize:
max
f￿￿
i;jg
q[￿i;j]xi;j ￿ q[￿i;j] !(i;j)
Using the men￿ s indi⁄erence conditions, we can re-write the woman￿ s problem as:
(1.2) v(j) = max
f￿￿
i;jg
q[￿i;j]xi;j ￿ ￿(i)￿i;j
Equilibrium
A matching equilibrium consists of a value ￿(i), a queue ￿i;;j such that:
1. Men and women are optimizing:
(a) The queue vector solves the optimization problem of women, given the values
of the men they hope to attract.10 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
(b) The men indi⁄erence conditions and their participation constraint are satis-
￿ed:
￿(i) ￿ Ri
where Ri is the men￿ s reservation value. The surplus must be greater than
or equal to the men￿ s reservation value. The men￿ s reservation value is the
value of staying single for the period and searching in the next period.
2. Markets clear such that the demand for men equals the supply
￿i ￿
X
￿j￿i;j
Given men￿ s expectations and the ￿rst order conditions from the woman￿ s opti-
mization problem, the queues only depend on the ratio of the surplus generated
by high types relative to low types. Women demand high types if the surplus gen-
erated from marrying a high type is greater than that of hiring a low type. The
marriage rate is simply the probability that a woman gets the surplus conditional
on her type, i.e. the probability that she gets at least one suitor.
1.3.2 Investments in Schooling and Value Functions
The value of a man at the start of the economy is:
V S = AL + ￿
￿
￿H(V S
H ￿ ￿m) + (1 ￿ ￿H)V S
L
￿1.3. THE MODEL 11
where:
V S
H = AH + P(￿H;j)V M
H;j
and
V S
L = AL + P(￿L;j)V M
L;j
An agent invests in schooling if the value of investing net the education cost is greater
than the value of not investing in schooling.
V S
L ￿ V S
H ￿ ￿
The fraction of men who invest in schooling is simply ￿H = Pr[￿ < ￿￿] where:
￿￿ ￿ V S
H ￿ V S
L
We de￿ne the returns to education:
V S
H ￿ V S
L = (AH ￿ AL) +
￿
P(￿H;j)V M
Hj ￿ P(￿L;j)V M
Lj
￿
The last expression decomposes the gains from schooling into the single life returns
and the marriage market returns to education.
We can write similar expressions for women. The fraction of women who invest in12 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
schooling is ￿U = Pr[￿ < ￿￿] where:
￿￿ ￿ V S
U ￿ V S
D
V S
U ￿ V S
D = (AU ￿ AD) +
￿
q(￿i;U)V M
i;U ￿ q(￿i;D)V M
i;D
￿
1.3.3 The Algorithm
As usual, the model can be solved backwards. We start by guessing on the distribution
of men and women entering the marriage market. Given these outcomes, we can update
the value functions and using the fraction of men and women who invest in schooling,
we also update the distribution. We continue our iterative process until we reach a
￿xed point. An equilibrium is reached when the gains from marriage conditional on
education resulting from given distributions of men and women entering the marriage
market, trigger schooling investments that exactly generate these distributions.
1.4 Household Values
We assume that a single household derives its utility from the value of its wage income
that is Ai = Ui(ci) and Aj = Uj(cj) where:
ci = wi
cj = wj1.5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 13
The married household derives utility from the value of its total household wage income
and a "residual" the utility generated from a non-market good.
￿ xij = cij + gij
where
cij = wi + wj
It is important to remember that the surplus is de￿ned as:
(1.3) xij = ￿ xij ￿ Ai ￿ Aj
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we use minimum distance estimation, choosing a vector of parameters
that minimizes the sum of the squared deviations between the data and the model
results. The estimation assumes that the model is a true version of the world. Given
data on wages conditional on education, we choose parameters of the model that match
marriage and education rates of men and women for the early cohort. There are 6 free
parameters to match 8 targets. Our targets are the education rates of men and women
(2), the fraction of college/no college educated who marry (2) and the assignment of
men to women/sorting patterns (4). Our free parameters are the output generated
from matches of each type fxl;d;xh;d;xl;u;xh;ug and the mean education cost f￿g.14 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
For the second part of our analysis, we repeat the procedure using data on wages of
men and women in 2008. Our model parameters are reported in Table 2 and Table 3.
We report the marriage surplus conditional on spousal education that is consistent with
the gender reversal in education in table 4.
Table 2: Early cohort
Estimated to match marriage rates and education rates for men and women married in 1968
xh;u = 2:64 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and coll women
xl;d = 5:25 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and no-coll women
xh;d = 8:50 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and no- coll women
xl;u = 2:06 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and coll women
￿ = 0:38 Mean of education cost distribution
Fixed Parameters: Set to match college wage premium and gender gap
Ah = 1:08 Labor market wages of college educated men
Au = 0:63 Labor market wages of college educated women
Al = 1:00 Labor market wages of no-coll. men
Ad = 0:59 Labor market wages of no-coll. women1.6. CONCLUSION 15
Table 3: New cohort
Estimated to match marriage rates and education rates for men and women married in 1998
xh;u = 13:52 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and coll women
xl;d = 3:33 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and no-coll women
xh;d = 3:65 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and no- coll women
xl;u = 5:19 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and coll women
￿ = 0:11 Mean of education cost distribution
Fixed Parameters: Set to match college wage premium and gender gap
Ah = 1:23 Labor market wages of college educated men
Au = 1:14 Labor market wages of college educated women
Al = 1:14 Labor market wages of no-coll. men
Ad = 0:95 Labor market wages of no-coll. women
Table 4: The Marriage Surplus 1968 1998 %￿
no coll (M)- no coll (W) 3.66 1.25 -65.8%
coll (M) - coll (W) 1.67 11.27 575.9 %
coll (M) - no coll (W) 7.21 1.60 -77.8 %
no coll (M) - coll (W) 0.80 2.92 265.0%
1.6 Conclusion
Using this simple model of investments in schooling and marriage, we can quantify the
relative changes in the marriage surplus that are consistent with marriage rates observed16 CHAPTER 1. THE GENDER REVERSAL IN COLLEGE COMPLETION
in the data and the gender reversal in college completion. Our directed search model
of marriage with ex-ante investments suggests that marital college premium increased
for women but not for men. The marital surplus decreased more for women with no
college education relative to college educated women. Knowles (2013) shows that men
regardless of college completion now spend more time involved in household work while
time spent doing household work has decreased more for college educated women than
for women without a college degree. Perhaps college educated women have become more
productive in the household sector.Chapter 2
Divorce Risk and The Decline of
Marriage
ABSTRACT - We use a simple directed search model of marriage to compare the mar-
riage surplus before and after the introduction of unilateral divorce laws. Although our
model can predict the decline in marriage, it remains a challenge to reconcile declining
marriage rates as a result of a decrease in divorce costs when divorce is a joint decision
and utility is fully transferable. Instead by taking divorce risk as given, the e⁄ect of
divorce on the value of match speci￿c investments is consistent with the decrease in
marriage rates observed in the data.
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2.1 Introduction
The e⁄ects of the liberalization of divorce laws have long been the focus of controversy
amongst policymakers, lawyers and economists. Empirical evidence suggests that the
introduction of unilateral divorce caused divorce rates to increase while marriage rates
decreased (see Rasul 2003,2005). The theoretical literature on the e⁄ect of divorce
costs on marriage formation has yet to reach a consensus. On one hand, lower divorce
costs make marriage less risky and so singles may be more likely to marry. On the
other hand, lower divorce costs reduce the gains from marriage and make singles less
likely to marry. At the core of the debate is the nature of bargaining within the
household. It proves challenging to reconcile the decline in marriage rates with a
theoretical framework that assumes transferable utility to re￿ ect the ability of spouses
to bargain e¢ ciently. On transferable utility, the Becker-Coase theorem reminds us that
if utility is fully transferable inside a marriage and in the absence of transaction costs,
divorce laws ought to have no e⁄ect on the incidence of marriage or divorce. Barring
asymmetric information or transaction costs, a change in the divorce law ought to have
no e⁄ect on the probability of marriage or divorce. New divorce laws would simply
redistribute property rights from the spouse who wished to remain in the marriage to
the spouse who wished to leave, without making them more likely to divorce or marry.
The empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of unilateral laws on divorce and marriage rates
suggests otherwise. Not surprisingly enough, most recent theories of marriage that
attempt to explain the e⁄ect of divorce laws on divorce and marriage formation rely2.2. STYLIZED FACTS 19
on non-transferable utility assuming the absence of bargaining within the marriage (see
Fella et al (2004) , Rasul (2003, 2005, 2008), Guha (2010) and Yurko (forthcoming).
In this paper, we choose not take a stand on the nature of bargaining and we do not
model the divorce decision explicitly. Instead we take the increase in divorce risk as
given and report predictions from the surplus maximizing approach with the assumption
of transferable utility. Although up until now there was no reason to prefer transferable
utility over non-transferable utility, recent empirical work, notably Friedberg and Stern
(2014) present evidence from the National Survey of Families and Households that bar-
gaining does take place within the married household and that spouses care about each
other.
The directed search model seems like an obvious choice since search is directed in the
marriage market (see, Greenwood, Guner, 2012). In addition, the directed search model
features frictional markets e¢ ciently coordinated by a decentralized pricing mechanism.
This implies that investments ex-ante or ex-post the matching process are not subject
to a hold up problem and that the equilibrium is unique and e¢ cient (see, Acemoglu
and Shimer,1999, Shimer 2005, Knowles 2012). The next section o⁄ers some stylized
facts. Section 3 describes the model and the algorithm used to solve the model. Section
4 presents a quantitative analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
2.2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document changes in college attainment, marriage rates and divorce
rates as observed in the US Census. We ￿rst look at property division, Community20 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
Property (CP) and Equitable Distribution (ED) reporting college attainment of men and
women, marriage and divorce statistics. The tables show ￿rst marriages by education
for all men and women aged 24-33 at the time of marriage in each property division
regime, well before and after the increase in divorce rates that followed the introduction
of unilateral divorce laws in the US. We also include the fraction of divorced couples from
these ￿rst marriages. These numbers are easily constructed using the year of marriage
variable and the marital status variables available in the 2008 American Community
Survey. The coding for divorce laws comes from Gruber (2004). From our tables, it
is clear that the divorce rate for positively sorted couples has decreased while that of
negatively sorted marriages has increased regardless of the property division regime
in place. The marriage rate has decreased in both divorce regimes. Our empirical
analysis is consistent with the property division having no e⁄ect marriage rates or divorce
rates. Our tables also document the gender reversal in education and the rise in positive
assortative matching. In the quantitative analysis section of this paper, we show that
our model can match these facts.2.2. STYLIZED FACTS 21
Table 1: (cohort: 1935-1944) CP1968 ED1968 Agg1968
College Educated Men 0.52 0.44 0.46
College Educated Women 0.42 0.35 0.37
Aggregate Marriage Rate 0.067 0.071 0.070
College (W) Marriage Rate 0.057 0.060 0.059
No Coll. (W) Marriage Rate 0.073 0.077 0.076
no coll (men)- no coll (women) 0.29 0.33 0.32
coll - coll 0.31 0.25 0.26
coll - no coll 0.35 0.37 0.37
no coll - coll 0.05 0.05 0.05
Observations 24239 70745 9498422 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
Table 2: (cohort: 1965-1974) CP1998 ED1998 Agg1998
College Educated Men 0.53 0.51 0.54
College Educated Women 0.58 0.65 0.61
Aggregate Marriage Rate 0.044 0.046 0.044
College (W) Marriage Rate 0.050 0.049 0.049
No Coll. (W) Marriage Rate 0.036 0.040 0.036
no coll (men)- no coll (women) 0.16 0.14 0.15
coll - coll 0.56 0.56 0.56
coll - no coll 0.17 0.16 0.17
no coll - coll 0.11 0.13 0.12
Observations 58629 132859 191488
Table 3: Divorced from 1968 marriage CP ED Agg
no coll (men)- no coll (women) <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
coll - coll 0.16 0.18 0.17
coll - no coll 0.21 0.17 0.18
no coll - coll <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
Table 4: Divorced from 1998 marriage CP ED Agg
no coll (men)- no coll (women) <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
coll - coll 0.15 0.14 0.14
coll - no coll 0.34 0.35 0.35
no coll - coll <0.1 <0.1 <0.12.3. THE MODEL 23
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 The environment
The economy is populated with two period lived agents M (men) and F (women) on
each side of the marriage market. The model is very simple in the sense that there are
no repeated marriage opportunities. At the start of the economy, agents are faced with
the decision to invest in education. For simplicity, the model assumes only two types of
men and women, a high type and a low type. Let the mass of single men of type i be
￿i and that of single women of type j be ￿j . i 2 fH;Lg denotes the type where L is
the low type and H the high type, for men and j 2 fU;Dg where D is a low type and U
is a high type for women. We assume that all agents pay a cost ￿ to participate in the
marriage market. We assume that ￿ is identically and independently distributed drawn
from a distribution that is symmetric around its mean. This participation cost is realized
before the participation decisions are resolved. For any successful meeting, the match
becomes a marriage at rate ￿J , the "marriage completion rate". For any successful
meeting, the match becomes a marriage at rate ￿J , the "marriage completion rate".
The marriage surplus is de￿ned as xij = ￿ xij ￿Ai ￿Aj where ￿ xij is the output generated
by the match, Ai and Aj are the single values of men and women respectively. Once
a marriage is "consummated", couples can choose to undertake a joint investment that
augments the surplus in the following period should the marriage were to survive. This
investment yields a return ki;j in the following period. Divorce occurs with exogenous
probability ￿i;j at the start of the second period. These assumptions are reasonable24 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
since this what we observe in the real world. Investments imply risk, they are costly
and do not yield immediate returns. In our framework in the advent of a divorce, the
investments are not realized and so an increase in the divorce risk reduces the incentive
to invest.
2.3.2 The Marriage Market
On each side of the marriage market there are 2 types of men and 2 types of women.
The matching mechanism involves directed search. Women are assigned to sub-markets
where they post type speci￿c marriage o⁄ers. Potential male suitors observe these
terms of marriage and choose which sub-market to enter. Although a woman may
receive applications from many suitors of the same type, matching occurs in pairs and
she is matched with a random man of the type she hoped to attract in the queue.
Matching
Each woman of type j is assigned to one of 2 sub-markets where they make a match-
speci￿c wage o⁄er !i;j so to attract a queue of suitors of type i. By committing to a
type speci￿c marriage contract, each woman is choosing a queue length where the queue
is de￿ned as the ratio of men of type i seeking to be matched with a type j woman. (the
inverse of the market tightness).
￿i;j ￿
￿i
￿j
Although each woman of type j can only be matched to one man of type i, a woman
of each type may receive more than one suitor of a given type and will choose a random2.3. THE MODEL 25
worker from the queue. The probability that a type j woman receives at least one suitor
a type i is:
q(￿i;;j) = ￿j1 ￿ e￿￿i;j
The probability, conditional on entering the marriage market, that a man of type h
gets the surplus is:
P(￿h;;j) =
q(￿h;;j)
￿h;j
=
￿j1 ￿ e￿￿h;j
￿h;;j
For type l men, they must face competition from type h men in the queue such that the
probability that a type l man gets the surplus is:
P(￿l;;j) =
q(￿l;;j)
￿l;j
=
￿je￿￿h;j1 ￿ e￿￿l;j
￿l;;j
In equilibrium, a man of type i must be indi⁄erent about which queue to enter:
(2.1) ￿(i) = P(￿i;j)!(i;j) =
q(￿i;j)
￿i;j
!(i;j)
!i;j = ￿(i)
1
P(￿i;j)
The above equation implies that a man faces a trade-o⁄between the likelihood of getting
the surplus P(￿i;j) =
q(￿i;j)
￿i;j and the value of the o⁄er !(i;j). The inverse relationship
between !(i;j) and P(￿i;j) implies that the higher the probability of getting the married,
the lower is the gain from marriage. In a submarket with low o⁄ers, the gain from being
matched is low and suitors are compensated by high arrival rates of marriage contracts.26 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
Women maximize:
max
f￿￿
i;jg
q[￿i;j]xi;j ￿ q[￿i;j] !(i;j)
Using the men￿ s indi⁄erence conditions, we can re-write the woman￿ s problem as:
(2.2) v(j) = max
f￿￿
i;jg
q[￿i;j]xi;j ￿ ￿(i)￿i;j
Equilibrium
A matching equilibrium consists of a value ￿(i), a queue ￿i;;j such that:
1. Men and women are optimizing:
(a) The queue vector solves the optimization problem of women, given the values
of the men they hope to attract.
(b) The men indi⁄erence conditions and their participation constraint are satis-
￿ed:
￿(i) ￿ Ri
where Ri is the men￿ s reservation value. The surplus must be greater than
or equal to the men￿ s reservation value. The men￿ s reservation value is the
value of staying single and not entering the marriage market.
2. Markets clear such that the demand for men equals the supply
￿i ￿
X
￿j￿i;j2.3. THE MODEL 27
Given men￿ s expectations and the ￿rst order conditions from the woman￿ s opti-
mization problem, the queues only depend on the ratio of the surplus generated
by high types relative to low types. Women demand high types if the surplus gen-
erated from marrying a high type is greater than that of hiring a low type. The
marriage rate is simply the probability that a woman gets the surplus conditional
on her type, i.e. the probability that she gets at least one suitor.
2.3.3 Match Speci￿c Investments
Given the expected returns from investing during the marriage, couples choose whether
to invest or not. Investments are a joint decision. This decision depends on the
realization of the idiosyncratic"marital bliss", the sunk cost of investments, the expected
divorce risk. Couples invest if:
(2.3) Vij + 2￿ ￿ Vijk , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ =
1
2
(Vijk ￿ Vij)
where the probability that a couple invests is Pr[￿ ￿ ￿￿].
The value of not investing is:
Vij = xij + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿ij)xij + ￿ij (Ai + Aj)]28 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
The value of investing is:
Vijk = xij + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿ijk)xijk + ￿ijk (Ai + Aj))]
where:
xijk = xij + kij
2.3.4 Solving the Model
As usual, the model can be solved backwards. Given the expected divorce allocations
and the risk of divorce, we compute the surplus generated by each type of marriages. We
then guess on the distribution of men and women who participate in the marriage market
at the start of the economy. Given the marriage outcomes, we update our guess and
iterate until we reach a ￿xed point. The equilibrium is reached when the gains from
marriage resulting from given distributions of men and women entering the marriage
market, trigger participation decisions that exactly generate these distributions.
2.4 Household Values
We assume that a single household derives its utility from the value of its wage income
that is Ai = Ui(ci) and Aj = Uj(cj) where:
ci = wi2.5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 29
cj = wj
The married household derives utility from the value of its total household wage income
and a "residual" the utility generated from a non-market good.
￿ xij = cij + gij
where
cij = wi + wj
It is important to remember that the surplus is de￿ned as:
(2.4) xij = ￿ xij ￿ Ai ￿ Aj
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we present a quantitative analysis. We use minimum distance estimation
which assumes that the model is a true version of the world for the early cohort. Our
￿xed parameters are the value of single/divorced households to re￿ ect the college wage
premia for men and women and the gender gap. We do not take a stand on the utility
￿ ow from investments and so we assume ki;j = 1. It is clear that identifying these
investments in the data will yield better model estimates, however for the purpose of
this study, we are only interested in showing that our model can generate a decline of
marriage as a result of an increase in divorce risk. The rest of the parameters are chosen30 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
to match marriage ￿ ows, sorting patterns and the divorce rate for the early cohort. We
report the surplus that is consistent with pre-reforms marriage market outcomes. For
the second part of our analysis, we hold the output of a match ￿xed and set the wages
and divorce rates observed for the new cohort. The following table shows parameters
of the model that re￿ ect marriage market outcomes before the introduction of unilateral
divorce laws.
Table 5: 1968 Marriage Market Conditions
Estimated to match marriage rates and divorce rates for men and women married in 1968
xh;u = 6:57 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and coll women
xl;d = 2:40 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and no-coll women
xh;d = 4:36 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and no- coll women
xl;u = 1:84 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and coll women
Fixed Parameters: Set to match college wage premium and gender gap
Ah = 1:08 Labor market wages of college educated men
Au = 0:59 ￿ Ah Labor market wages of college educated women
Al = 1 Labor market wages of no-coll. men
Ad = 0:59 ￿ Al Labor market wages of no-coll. women2.5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 31
Table 6 compares the data with our model predictions. By model predictions, it is
important to specify that marriage rates are not targeted in this section. Using the
results from our minimum distance estimation for the 1968 market conditions, the
model predictions are results from comparative statics exercises. Column A presents
results after an adjustment in divorce risk whilst keeping wages at their 1968 level.
Column B re￿ ects changes in both wages and divorce risk. Column B is an indication
of the predicting power of our directed search model. Although our model does not
generate a large enough decline in marriage rates (magnitude), the marriage rates
move in the direction of our data observations. The model is good at replicating the
increase in positive assortative matching as observed in the US data.
Table 6: Comparative Statics Data/Model Est.1968 A B Data1998
College Educated Men 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.54
College Educated Women 0.37 0.61 0.61 0.61
Aggregate Marriage Rate 0.070 0.070 0.063 0.044
College (W) Marriage Rate 0.059 0.061 0.058 0.049
No Coll. (W) Marriage Rate 0.076 0.074 0.069 0.036
no coll (men)- no coll (women) 0.32 0.35 0.23 0.15
coll - coll 0.26 0.26 0.45 0.56
coll - no coll 0.37 0.34 0.23 0.17
no coll - coll 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.1232 CHAPTER 2. DIVORCE RISK AND THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE
Table 7 shows the parameters of the model that re￿ ect marriage market outcomes after
the introduction of unilateral divorce laws.
Table 7: 1998 Marriage Market Conditions
Estimated to match marriage rates and divorce rates for men and women married in 1998
xh;u = 4:38 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and coll women
xl;d = 1:76 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and no-coll women
xh;d = 2:11 To match fraction of marriages between coll men and no- coll women
xl;u = 2:11 To match fraction of marriages between no-coll men and coll women
Fixed Parameters: Set to match college wage premium and gender gap
Ah = 1:23 Labor market wages of college educated men
Au = 0:92 ￿ Ah Labor market wages of college educated women
Al = 1:14 Labor market wages of no-coll. men
Ad = 0:92 ￿ Al Labor market wages of no-coll. women
Table 8 shows the decrease in the marriage surplus that is consistent with the US data.
The surplus decreased for all, however it decreased more for women with no college
education than for women with a college education regardless of who they marry.
Table 8: The Marriage Surplus Before After %￿
no coll (M)- no coll (W) 3.09 1.38 -55.3
coll (M) - coll (W) 9.55 5.49 -42.5
coll (M) - no coll (W) 5.97 1.75 -70.7
no coll (M) - coll (W) 2.07 1.90 -8.22.6. CONCLUSION 33
Table 9: Value of Match Speci￿c Investments Before After % ￿
no coll (M)- no coll (W) 0.75 0.75 0
coll (M) - coll (W) 0.62 0.64 3.2
coll (M) - no coll (W) 0.61 0.49 -19.7
no coll (M) - coll (W) 0.75 0.75 0
2.6 Conclusion
The existing literature has concluded that unilateral divorce laws caused divorce rates to
increase while marriage rates decreased. Using our framework, we are able to replicate
the decline in marriage rates when divorce risk reduces the incentive to invest in match
speci￿c investments. We are able to quantify and document the changes in the marriage
surplus that are consistent with the evolution of the marriage market, wage growth and
changes in the attainments in education of men and women. Consistent with the
gender reversal in college completion, we ￿nd that the surplus decreased for women with
no college education relative to women with a college education regardless of who they
marry. Our approach provides a simple blueprint for future research when trying to
solve the puzzle of how to reconcile a model of marriage and divorce with transferable
utility where increasing divorce risk leads to a decrease in marriage rates.Chapter 3
Undocumented Migrants: The
Source Country Perspective
ABSTRACT - In this paper, we model job search and temporary migration with
human capital investments to explain labor market outcomes of migrant workers. We
decompose the legal status decision into the e⁄ect of expected labor market outcomes
and that of migration costs. Using the model calibrated to match outcomes both during
and after the migration spell, we ￿nd that documented migrants are more likely to invest
in new skills however it is low skilled workers who are more likely to invest than the high
skilled. Temporary migration provides an opportunity for less skilled workers to catch-
up to high skilled workers who return. Our simple framework contributes to the Brain
Gain/Drain discussion.
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3.1 Introduction
Labor market experiences vary greatly for migrant workers of di⁄erent education attain-
ment. Some workers become documented migrants while others do not. Disaggregated
data on Egyptian return migrants suggest that although there￿ s a wage premium for be-
ing a documented worker, some workers regardless of schooling attainment still choose to
migrate and work without the proper documentation. Documented workers stay longer
while undocumented workers have shorter job duration abroad and are more likely to
return due to poor working conditions. Lastly, this "legal status" e⁄ect persists when we
compare the wages of return migrant workers when they return. In this paper we ask:
(1) Given the wage premium for legal status, why are there undocumented workers? (2)
Why does this wage premium for legal status persist even when workers return to their
source country labor market? (3) Since migration serves as an opportunity to invest in
new skills, who is more likely to invest? Documented workers or Undocumented migrant
workers? High skilled or Low skilled migrants?. Human capital investments can explain
why the schooling wage gap is higher among non-migrants than among returnees.
In order to understand the legal status decision and to quantify the gains from
temporary migration conditional on education and legal status, we write down a model
of e¢ cient migration decisions, and job search in the labor market with on the job
human capital investments. Using the model calibrated to match observed labor market
outcomes of migrant workers both during and after the migration spell, we ￿nd that
although documented migrants are more likely to invest in new skills than undocumented36CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
workers, it is low skilled migrants who are more likely to invest than high skilled migrants.
This is consistent with high skilled workers having higher returns from working abroad
and so when workers must return as in the case of temporary migration, the gains from
investments are greater for low skilled workers than for high skilled workers. Temporary
migration provides an opportunity for less skilled workers to catch-up to high skilled
workers who return.
The important contributions of Docquier and Rapoport (2004,2008) are worth men-
tioning, in the sense that they discuss the source country perspective. They investigate
empirically the impact of the brain drain on human capital formation in the source coun-
try. Some of the literature considers that return migrants may bring skills or capital
to the home economy and thereby contribute to the positive e⁄ects of migration on the
source country (Postel-Vinay et al. 2003, Mayr and Peri, 2008, Wahba 2001, Wahba and
Zenou 2012).
In this paper, we propose that legal work status has important implications for the
brain drain/brain gain discussion. The intuition is simple. If temporary migration
serves as an opportunity to aquire new skills, then host country sanctions on undocu-
mented workers, shorten the duration of migration thus reducing the likelihood that an
undocumented migrant aquires new skills before returning. Our premise is also consis-
tent with early work in this literature on the duration of migration and the probability
of work e⁄ort notably Galor and Stark (1989). In our simple model of temporary work
migration, workers exert e⁄ort on the job to acquire new skills that make them more
productive workers forever. This is a nice feature of our search and matching model3.1. INTRODUCTION 37
as in Kennes and Knowles (2012). The likelihood that a migrant invests in new skills
depends on the duration of migration (which in turn depends on their legal status) as
well as the expected returns from these investments as a returnee back in the source
country.
Our contribution is three-fold: (1) We construct a new directed search model of
the labor market where heterogenous ￿rms and workers on both sides of a frictional
labor market can make decisions ex-ante and ex-post the matching process that are
socially e¢ cient since they are "surplus maximizing" (see search-theoretic literature:
Moen,1996, Acemoglu and Shimer,1999, Shimer 2005, Menzio and Shi 2011). (2) Using
our model, we can decompose the legal status decision into the role of expected labor
market outcomes and the e⁄ect of migration costs. (3) We use the model to back out
the likelihood that a migrant invests given his education, legal status and job experience.
Finally, our paper sheds some light on the link between skill and legal worker status,
highlighting important implications for the brain gain/brain drain discussion. We stress
the simplicity with which our framework can prove useful for the design of policies that
bene￿t both the source and host economies. Our model speaks to host country policies
aiming to attract the most productive temporary migrant workers while the concern
for the source country may be to bene￿t from more productive workers who return.
Our directed search model features heterogenous workers who have the opportunity to
search for heterogenous jobs from two labor markets. Workers move between the states
of unemployment and employment. When employed, they can invest in new skills and
when their job ends, they move to di⁄erent employers because of di⁄erences in their labor38CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
market experience, and in match-speci￿c and country speci￿c productivity di⁄erences.
On one side of the market, ￿rms are surplus maximizing, doing so by choosing what
type of vacancies to create. The type of a vacancy is given by the value that it o⁄ers to
a worker. On the other side of the market, workers choose where to search, and if they
self-select to work abroad, they decide whether to search as undocumented workers or
as "legal" workers.
Recent work worth mentioning is that of Chassamboulli and Peri (2014) where they
investigate the host country labor market e⁄ects of reducing illegal workers using a
search-theoretic approach. They ￿nd that increasing deportation rates have a negative
e⁄ect on job creation in the host country, thus also having a negative e⁄ect on natives
in the host country. To put it midly, shorter job duration has a negative e⁄ect on
the surplus. Our results have similar implications however our focus is on the source
economy, particularly on the migration decision and the labor market experience of
migrant workers. If migration serves as an opportunity for skill upgrading, then sanctions
on undocumented labor are consistent with less productive undocumented workers both
in the host but also in the source economy when migrants return. Our paper di⁄ers from
theirs in the sense that we take into account the ex-ante skill composition of workers.
In our framework, workers can also invest in new skills, which is an important reason
why workers migrate in the ￿rst place. Our paper makes the case that the e⁄ect of
job duration abroad will di⁄er greatly for migrants of di⁄erent levels of education. The
intuition is simple: a higher education premium abroad will make high skilled workers
more attached to their jobs abroad relative to low skilled workers.3.1. INTRODUCTION 39
The data used for this project is the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS
2012). Temporary migration has played an important role in Egypt since the early 1970s.
One indicator of the importance of international migration is that about 15% of the
Egyptian households have a returnee or a current migrant. In 2012, 6.8 % of households
had at least one member of the household currently working overseas, and 9.8 % of
households had a returnee. The data is nationally representative sample consisting of
12,060 households and 49,186 individuals. Among these individuals we observe return
migrants who migrated legally and those who migrated illegally. The de￿nition used for
return migrant is that of a working-age individual (15-59) who has worked abroad for 6
months or longer. The de￿nition used for legal migrant worker is: (1) a migrant who
had a visa or work permit or (2) a migrant whose destination country did not require
a visa or work permit. This rich dataset also includes education, employment histories,
wages, remittances, savings which all point to a wage penalty for undocumented workers
in line with previous ￿ndings in this literature.
We parameterize our model to match the wage pro￿les of workers and the unemploy-
ment rates by educational attainment observed in the Egyptian data, namely ELMPS,
2012. We compare model predictions with ELMPS data regarding the fraction of workers
who ￿nd jobs as documented/undocumented workers. We also quantify the unobserved
positive visa costs that are consistent with "observed" migrant outcomes. In addition,
given the labor market outcomes of return migrants back in the source country, we can
back out the probability that a migrant invests in new skills conditional on education
and legal status. In our model, an increase in the legal status cost decreases the surplus40CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
for documented work relative to undocumented work causing the fraction of workers
who stay undocumented to increase. Migrants have an incentive to invest in new skills
only if these new skills improve their market prospects when they return to their home
economy. The paper is organized as follows, in the next section we present some em-
pirical facts about temporary migration which we will use for our quantitative analysis.
In section 3, we present the model. Section 4 presents our application of the theory and
we quantify the value of investments that is consistent with temporary migrant labor
market outcomes in Egypt . Section 5 provides a brief discussion of our ￿ndings and
we conclude in section 6.
3.2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we present some stylized facts about the foreign work experience of tem-
porary egyptian migrants. Since temporary migrants return, ELMPS 2012 documents
responses from return migrants regarding their migration experience abroad. We class
those without a high school education as low skilled and those with high school and above
as high skilled Egyptians. We denote the fraction of managerial and professional jobs
as white collar jobs and the rest as blue collar jobs. The majority of Egyptian migrants
go to work in the Gulf states and so we pool all destinations which in our quantitative
analysis will represent the foreign labor market in our model economy. This fact also
implies that migration costs in this context do not refer to transportation or distance
costs but instead they may be more synonymous with barriers of entry. Using the CPI
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them below. Last but most importantly, we must de￿ne undocumented workers. An
undocumented worker is a migrant worker who reported to have migrated without a
work visa or work permit in destinations that required a work visa. For destinations
that did not require an entry visa, we de￿ne undocumented workers as those workers who
did not have a work contract for their observed period of employment abroad. In our
data, 22.6 % of temporary migrant workers with a high school education or above were
undocumented. This is eye-opening considering the market premium for documented
high skilled workers. As expected a higher percentage (36.1%) of low skilled workers
than high skilled workers were undocumented.
Table 1: ELMPS 2012 Observed Migration Flows
Working age population Migration Choice Documentation
Less than HS 3.4% < HS migrate 296/463 (63.9%)
HS and above 4.3% >= HS migrate 500/646 (77.4%)
3.2.1 Egyptian Population
The following table provides a description of the observed Egyptian population.
Table 2: Distribution of skills (education)
Working age population Total Population Non-Migrants Migrants
Less than HS (Obs) 13,654 13,191 463
HS and above (Obs) 15,063 (52.45%) 14,417 (52.22 %) 646 (58.25%)42CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
Table 3: ELMPS 2012: Egyptian Labor Market Population
Less than HS (Obs) - Documented 1%
Less than HS (Obs) - Undocumented 0.51%
HS and above - Documented 1.7%
HS and above - Undocumented 0.51%
Less than HS 45.9%
HS and above 50.2%
3.2.2 Egyptian Labor Market
The following tables describe the population of workers observed in Egypt in 2012. Table
4 presents wages and observed assignment of workers to jobs for employed workers in
Egypt in 2012.3.2. STYLIZED FACTS 43
Table 4: Egyptian Labor market outcomes Wages Occ. Sorting
Non Migrant Less than HS, Blue Collar Job 913.4 30.9 %
Non Migrant HS and above, Blue Collar Job 1105.2 43.1 %
Non Migrant HS and above, White Collar Job 1385.2 19.4 %
Return M. Less than HS, Documented, Blue collar Job 959.0 1.5 %
Return M. Less than HS, Undocumented, Blue collar Job 911.7 0.9 %
Return M. HS and above, Documented, Blue collar Job 1112.9 2.5 %
Return M. HS and above, Undocumented, Blue collar Job 954.9 0.9 %
Return M. HS and above, Documented, White collar Job 1507.3 0.6 %
Return M. HS and above, Undocumented, White collar Job 1168.7 0.2%44CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
3.2.3 Migration Experience
"The migration experience" refers to outcomes of migrants in the destination labor
market.
Table 5: Destination Labor market outcomes Wages Occ. Sorting Duration in years
<HS, Documented, Blue collar Job 7161.0 26.4 % 3.86 (0.09)*
< HS, Undocumented, Blue collar Job 6582.9 15.5 % 3.18 (0.07)
HS +, Documented, Blue collar Job 6929.8 39.6 % 3.64 (0.08)
HS +, Undocumented, Blue collar Job 6913.7 12.7 % 2.97 (0.07)
HS +, Documented, White collar Job 9955.0 5.8 % 5.38 (0.12)
*Duration of migration as a fraction of the 45 year working life.
Table 6: Employed Return Migrant population*
<HS, Documented, Blue collar Job 0.010
< HS, Undocumented, Blue collar Job 0.006
HS +, Documented, Blue collar Job 0.015
HS +, Undocumented, Blue collar Job 0.005
HS +, Documented, White collar Job 0.002
*Return migrants as a fraction of total employed Egyptian labor force3.3. THE MODEL 45
3.3 The Model
There are two labor markets that represent two countries open to international migration
￿ ows. Agents are heterogenous in their individual productivity, their idiosyncratic
propensity to migrate, as well as in their labor market job experience. There are two
types of jobs in each labor market with constant returns to scale both in production
and in searching. We assume free-entry. As long as the surplus is positive, each type
of vacancy commits to a contract that depends only on the expected surplus generated
from a potential match. These posted contracts are type speci￿c to attract queues of
applicants. Workers of each type observe these wages/contracts and apply for one job.
We refer to the queues as sub-markets which are populated with a measure of unemployed
workers of type i applying for a vacant job o. The surplus is de￿ned as the expected
output from a successful match net of the sum of the outside options. In equilbrium
workers, are indi⁄erent about which sub-market to enter, hence all sub-markets must
give the same expected value for workers of the same type. This equilibrium condition
implies a tradeo⁄ between the probability that a worker ￿nds a job and the wage the
worker receives. Workers are more likely to be employed at a low skilled job but receive
lower wages than they would at a high skilled job where they are less likely to ￿nd a
job due to longer queues of applicants. The vacancy hires a random applicant from the
queue of applicants. Matching occurs in pairs. Firms always ￿nd it optimal to o⁄er
wages that are bilaterally e¢ cient, in the sense that the contracts maximize the sum of
the worker￿ s lifetime utility and the ￿rm￿ s lifetime pro￿ts from forming a match (Menzio46CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
and Shi, 2011). Full information, wage posting, commitment and transferable utility
insure e¢ ciency: the decentralized solution coincides with the social planner￿ s solution.
All decisions on both sides of the market ex-ante and ex-post the matching process are
e¢ cient and not subject to a hold-up problem (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
3.3.1 Participants
The economy is populated with a continuum of ￿rms and two types of two-period lived
workers who can choose to search for work opportunities in one of two distinct labor
markets each period and can end up working in one of two types of occupations. We
denote ￿i the fraction of skilled and unskilled workers, where i 2 fH,Lg. Vacancies are
heterogeneous such that the fraction of vacancies is ￿o where o 2 fW;Bg, for white collar
and blue collar vacancies respectively. Opportunities to migrate arrive in the ￿rst period
of a worker￿ s life however, in the second period of a worker￿ s life, search is restricted to the
source country labor market. This assumption ensures that there is no repeat migration.
Workers are heterogenous in their migration costs. Workers observe migration costs and
choose whether to search abroad or in the local market given expected labor market
outcomes. Agents face a deterministic education speci￿c cost ￿i which we refer to as
legal status costs. The di⁄erence between the discounted value of searching abroad and
that of staying de￿nes the gain from temporary migration. We denote m 2 fH;Fg the
home country labor market and foreign labor market respectively. We de￿ne return
migrants as those whose jobs end abroad and return to search in the source country.
At the beginning of the ￿rst period, workers can choose from one of three options.3.3. THE MODEL 47
They can choose toenter the market and search in the home labor market or to search
in the foreign labor market as a legal or as an undocumented worker l 2 fD;Ug. Since
international migration ￿ ows are still quite low relative to what we expect given the large
wage di⁄erentials, we denote ￿ 2 (0;1], an additional migration friction that lowers the
value of foreign search. ￿ is exogenous, however it has no bearing on the distribution
of worker skill endowments observed in each labor market since it is common to all
workers regardless of their type and can represent a measure of the foreign country
market barriers of entry. Unlike ￿, legal status costs are education speci￿c and so a
change in these costs changes the skill composition of migrants who search in the foreign
labor market. We use the words undocumented and illegals interchangeably throughout
the paper. After a match occurs, migrants can also exert e⁄ort on the job to develop
their human capital in the foreign economy, denoted by s 2 fE;N) for e⁄ort and no
e⁄ort respectively. These investments change the state of the worker forever. When a
match ends with exogenous probability ￿(i;l;m;o) 2 (0;1], migrant workers can choose
to become unemployed and search in the local labor market or not to participate in the
home labor market. The value of human capital investments depends on the duration
of migration, and the expected returns from these investments in the source country
labor market as a returnee.
Non-migrants are workers who self-select to search in the home labor market of each
skill type. Workers who ￿nd jobs abroad become migrants and those who searched
abroad but did not ￿nd a job end up unemployed non-migrants. These unemployed
non-migrants must wait until the next period to get a second search opportunity, this48CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
time limited to the home labor market. However, self-selected non-migrants who ￿nd
a local job stay matched forever, whilst migrant workers must return to search in the
home labor market when their foreign employment ends. In a sense, searching abroad is
modelled as a "risk-taker"￿ s opportunity to invest in new skills. The types are returnees
present in the home labor market are workers who migrated in the previous period as
documented or undocumented migrants of each skill type, those who had invested in
new skills and those who did not.
3.3.2 The Labor Market and Wage Determination
In the foreign labor market there are 4 types of workers who self-select to search as
migrants, documented and undocumented workers of each education type . In the
home market, there are 2 types of non-migrants and 4 possible types of returnees. Each
￿rm can only post one job and each worker can only apply for one job however each job
can receive more than one application from a given type of workers but can hire only one
worker resulting in equilibrium unemployment. We assume that un￿lled jobs produce
nothing. We de￿ne the surplus as the output created from a successful match net of
the worker￿ s reservation value. Vacancies are created so long as the surplus is positive.
Matching
The economy is populated with a continuum of F ￿rms that can choose to open either a
white collar job or a blue collar job. Each job of type o in country m posts type-speci￿c
wage o⁄ers !i;l;m;o so to attract a queue of workers corresponding to a sub-market . By3.3. THE MODEL 49
committing to a type speci￿c wage o⁄er, each vacancy is choosing a queue length where
the queue is de￿ned as the ratio of workers of type i;l applying for a vacancy of type
m;o (the inverse of the labor market tightness).
￿i;l;m;o ￿
￿i;l
￿m;o
Although each job can only be matched to one worker, jobs of each type may receive
more than one applicant of a given type and will choose a random worker from the
queue. The probability that a type m;o vacancy receives at least one application from
a type i;l worker is:
q(￿i;l;m;o) = 1 ￿ e￿￿i;l;m;o
The probability, conditional on applying, that a worker of type i;l is matched with
a ￿rm of type m;o is:
P(￿h;l;m;o) =
q(￿i;l;m;o)
￿i;l;m;o
=
1 ￿ e￿￿i;l;m;o
￿i;l;m;o
In equilibrium workers must be indi⁄erent about which queue to enter:
(3.1) ￿(i;l;m;o) =
q(￿i;l;w;o)
￿i;l;w;o
!(i;l;m;w;s) =
q(￿i;l;b;o)
￿i;l;b;o
!(i;l;m;b;s)
where:
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The above equation implies that the worker faces a trade-o⁄ between the likelihood
of receiving a job o⁄er and the value of the job o⁄er. In a submarket with low wages,
the gain from ￿nding a job is low and the workers are compensated by a high arrival
rate of job o⁄ers.
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem can be written as:
max
f￿￿
i;l;m;og
fYi;l;m;o ￿ q[￿i;l;m;o] !(i;l;m;o;s)g
where the expected output generated from the match is:
Yi;l;m;o = (1 ￿ e￿￿i;l;m;o)xi;l;m;o = q[￿i;l;m;o] xi;l;m;o
Using the worker￿ s indi⁄erence conditions, we can re-write the ￿rm￿ s problem as:
(3.2) max
f￿￿
i;l;m;og
q[￿￿
i;l;m;o] xi;l;m;o ￿ ￿(i;l;m;o)￿￿
i;l;m;o
Equilibrium
A matching equilibrium consists of a value ￿(i;l;m;o), a queue ￿i;;l;m;o such that:
1. Workers and ￿rms are optimizing:
(a) The queue vector solves the optimization problem of ￿rms, given the values
of the workers they hope to attract.
(b) The workers indi⁄erence conditions and their participation constraint are sat-3.3. THE MODEL 51
is￿ed:
￿(i;l;m;o) ￿ Ri
where Ri is the worker￿ s reservation value. The surplus must be greater than
or equal to the worker￿ s reservation value. The worker￿ s reservation value is
the value of staying unemployed for the period.
2. Markets clear such that the demand for workers equals the supply
￿i;l ￿
X
￿o;m￿i;l;m;o
3.3.3 Value Functions
Firms
The value of a vacant job is:
JV
m;o = ￿c + ￿q(￿￿
i;l;m;o)JF
i;l;m;o;s
where c is the cost of maintaining a vacant job.
The value of a ￿lled vacancy conditional on the country and type of vacancy is:
(3.3)
JF
i;l;m;o;s = xi;l;m;o￿w￿
i;l;m;o+￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿(i;l;m;o;s)) (xi;l;m;o ￿ w￿
i;l;m;o) + ￿(i;l;m;o;s)JV
m;o
￿
We assume free entry of ￿rms, which in equilibrium implies zero expected pro￿ts from52CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
vacancy posting JV
m;b = 0, JV
m;w = ￿m;wand so we can re-write:
￿m;w = ￿c + ￿q(￿￿
i;l;m;w)JF
i;l;m;w;s
0 = ￿c + ￿q(￿￿
i;l;m;b)JF
i;l;m;b;s
These expressions state that given a positive vacancy to applicant ratio in a given sub-
market i;l;m;o, then the cost from opening a vacancy must be equal to the bene￿t.
￿m;o > 0 is the cost of creating a white collar vacancy. The fraction of white collar jobs
￿m;w = Pr[￿m;o < ￿￿
m;o]
￿￿
m;o ￿ JV
m;w ￿ JV
m;b
Workers
The expected value of an unemployed non-migrant of type i
(3.4) V U
i;h;o = Ri;h + P(￿￿
i;h;o)V E
i;h;o
where
Ri;h = Ai;h + ￿ V U
i;h;o
and Ai;h is an exogenous variable capturing non-wage income and amenities in the origin
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The expected value of searching for legal jobs for migrants of type i:
(3.5) V U
i;d;f;o = Ri;d + P(￿￿
i;d;f;o)V E
i;d;f;o;s ￿ ￿i
where
Ri;d = Ai;d + ￿V U
i;h;o
V U
i;h;o is the value of being unemployed and searching in the source country labor market
since there are no repeat migration opportunities. Workers who are not matched in the
foreign market are simply dropped back into the pool of unemployed non-migrants for
the duration of the period until the next period labor market opens again.
The expected value of searching for illegal jobs for migrants of type i:
(3.6) V U
i;u;f;o = Ri;u + P(￿￿
i;u;f;o)(V E
i;u;f;o;s)
Ri;u = Ai;u + ￿ V U
i;h;o
where Ai;l is an exogenous variable capturing non-market value of searching for jobs
abroad such as the e⁄ect of friends and family who may change migrants expectations
when searching for a job abroad.
The value of an employed legal worker is:
(3.7) V E
i;d;f;o;s = !￿
i;d;f;o + ￿
0
B B
@
￿(i;d;f;o;s) V U
i;h;o;s
+[1 ￿ ￿(i;d;f;o;s)] V E
i;d;f;o;s)
1
C C
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The value of an employed illegal worker is:
(3.8) V E
i;u;f;o;s = !￿
i;u;f;o + ￿
0
B B
B B
B B
@
￿V U
i;h;o
+(1 ￿ ￿)[(￿(i;u;f;o;s)V U
i;h;o;s
+[1 ￿ ￿(i;u;f;o;s)] V E
i;u;f;o;s]
1
C C
C C
C C
A
where ￿ is the probability of a policy that sanctions undocumented workers and deports
them.
The value of an employed non-migrant worker is:
(3.9) V E
i;H;o = !￿
i;h;o ￿ (1 + ￿)
These non-migrants stay employed for both periods, and so search abroad must com-
pensate them for the risk of going abroad and having to search again when they return.
The value of an unemployed return migrant conditional on the education type and
the likelihood of investments:
(3.10) V U
i;l;h;o;s = R(i;l;m;o;s) + P(￿￿
i;h;o;s)V E
i;l;h;o;s ￿ ￿
Similarly to non-migrants, return migrants only participate if:
P(￿￿
i;h;o)V E
i;l;h;o;s ￿ ￿ ￿ R(i;l;m;o;s)3.3. THE MODEL 55
where the threshold cost is:
￿￿ ￿ P(￿￿
i;h;o)V E
i;l;h;o;s ￿ R(i;l;m;o;s)
If a returnee does not ￿nd a job, the returnee who invested abroad consumes:
R(i;l;m;o;e) > Ai;h
otherwise, he is a return migrant who did not take advantage of the opportunity to
invest in a new skills abroad and he consumes:
R(i;l;m;o;n) = Ai;h
On the Job Investments In our framework, workers in the foreign labor market can
make on the job investments that make them more productive returnees.
The value of an employed worker conditional on education, legal status and vacancy
type is:
(3.11) V E
i;l;f;o;s = (￿￿)I(i;l;f;o;e) + (1 ￿ ￿￿)I(i;l;f;o;n)56CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
where
I(i;d;m;o;s) = !￿(i;d;m;o)
+￿
0
B
B
@
￿(i;d;m;o;s) V U
i;d;h;o;s
+(1 ￿ ￿(i;d;m;o;s)) V E
i;d;f;o;s
1
C
C
A
Illegal workers must face the risk of sanctions ￿ which destroys their jobs and can shorten
the duration of migration, reducing the likelihood that they will be able to invest in new
skills.
I(i;u;m;o;s) = !￿(i;u;m;o)
+￿
0
B
B
@
￿V U
i;h;o + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿(i;u;m;o;s)V U
i;u;h;o;s
+(1 ￿ ￿(i;U;m;o;s)V E
i;u;f;o;s]
1
C
C
A
3.3.4 Migration Decisions
At the start of the economy, workers can choose to search for opportunities as a legal
migrant, illegal migrant or non-migrant. A worker self-selects to search abroad if the
value of source country search is less than the value of searching for opportunities abroad:
(3.12)
￿
￿iDV U
i;d;f;o + (1 ￿ ￿iD)V U
i;u;f;o
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ V U
i;h;o
The probability Pr[￿ ￿ ￿￿] ￿ ￿iF is the fraction of migrants who self-selects to search
for jobs in the foreign economy. Workers who self-select to search abroad can become3.3. THE MODEL 57
documented or undocumented migrants and they choose "legal status" if:
(3.13) V U
i;d;f;o ￿ ￿ ￿ V U
i;u;f;o
where Pr[￿ ￿ ￿￿] ￿ ￿iD is the probability that worker chooses legal status. The idiosyn-
cracies are assumed to be independent of each other and across individuals. We assume
each distribution to be symmetric around its mean. We believe using iid terms is a
neutral and reasonable assumption.
The value of an unemployed worker of skill i at the start of the working life is:
(3.14) V U
i = ￿iF ￿
￿
￿iDV U
i;d;f;o + (1 ￿ ￿iD)V U
i;u;f;o
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿iF ￿)V U
i;h;o
From the worker￿ s maximization problem, we know that a worker self-selects into
the market that maximizes his lifetime utility given the deterministic visa cost, the
realization of their preference for the home country and their individual risk aversion.
The natural result that arises from our simple model is that workers always choose to
search where the value of search is highest given their respective type. Workers of
di⁄erent types have di⁄erent trade-o⁄s between the probability of ￿nding a new job
and the value o⁄ered by the job. In equilibrium, all workers face a choice between
searching for vacancies that o⁄er relatively higher wages and searching for vacancies
that are relatively easier to ￿nd. This explains why similar workers choose to search for
di⁄erent types of jobs and display di⁄erent job ￿nding rates and di⁄erent wage pro￿les
and job histories. It is also important to note that given a ￿xed legal status cost,58CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
workers whose expected gains from foreign employment are highest are more likely to
become documented workers, explaining why more educated workers are more likely to
search for legal foreign employment. This is consistent with the theoretical work of
Chassamboulli and Peri (2014). While their model is di⁄erent from ours, their main
￿ndings are similar.
3.3.5 Demographics
In order to close out the model, We must also keep track of the population of unem-
ployed workers of each characteristic at home and abroad. At the beginning of the ￿rst
period, the labor market is ￿ ooded with unemployed workers made up of the mass of
workers who select to search abroad, those who search at home and the mass of return
migrants documented and undocumented who had migrated in the previous period and
returned to search at the start of the current period. In our model workers only live for
two market opportunities which makes the distribution relatively easy to track across
di⁄erent labor market experiences. The following expression simply states that the
number of unemployed in the second period is equal to the number of unemployed who
did not ￿nd a job in the ￿rst period and those who lost their jobs at the start of the
period (i.e. Return migrants)
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3.3.6 Algorithm
To solve the model, we start by guessing on the distribution of types of workers and jobs
who enter the ￿nal period (Return migrants and non-migrants in the source country
labor market). We solve the matching problem, that is the choice of optimal queue
lengths. Given the ￿nal period market outcomes, we can solve the model backwards by
updating the value functions which also updates our population guess with the optimal
distribution of worker skill and legal status in the population of unemployed job seekers
that enter each market at the beginning of the economy. We repeat the process until we
reach a ￿xed point and the matching rates in each labor market are constant after each
iteration: the equilibrium is reached when the gains from migration resulting from a
given distributions of workers entering the foreign labor market, triggers decisions that
exactly generate these distributions.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis and Application of the theory
This section presents a simple application of the theory. Our objective is to map our
data observations to the model so that we can decompose the distribution of migrant
workers observed abroad into the e⁄ect of the labor market outcomes and the e⁄ect
of the skill speci￿c visa costs. Using our model, we can also quantify the gains from
becoming a documented migrant and the unobserved likelihood that a migrant aquires
new skills in the foreign economy given the migrant￿ s current as well as expected market
prospects as a return migrant.60CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
We parameterize the model by combining two groups of parameters. Fixed pa-
rameters are taken directly from the ELMPS 2012 data and the second group: free
parameters chosen to jointly match some moments of this same dataset. We ￿x the
fraction of high types as the fraction of Egyptians with at least a high school education
or better ￿H = 0:52. We ￿x the discount factor ￿ = 0:92. The home preference and
risk aversion distributions are normally distributed with mean 0 and the variance ￿￿ = 1
and ￿￿ = 1 respectively.
The surplus is parametric. There is one parameter for the output generated by each
type of worker-vacancy pair, non￿ migrants (2x2), migrants (4x2), and return migrants
(4x2), the education speci￿c autarky values (6), the vacancy posting cost (1). Since no
illegal worker and no worker with less than HS education are employed at a white collar
job, we set the output generated by these types of matches (4) equal to zero leaving us
a total of 23 free parameters. Since we do not observe any deportations in our data,
we set the deportation rate equal to 0. Since all migrants return at the end of their
foreign employment contract, the job separation rates are ￿xed to re￿ ect the fraction
of a migrant￿ s working life spent abroad. ￿(i;l;m;o) ￿ T ￿ d(i;l;m;o) where T = 1
is the total working lifespan of a worker and d(i;l;m;o) is the job duration abroad as
a fraction of the migrant￿ s total working life (45 years). These separations rates are
reported in table 7. The migration friction ￿ is set to match the mean migration rate
3:85%. In our framework, although ￿ < 1 reduces the ￿ ow of workers who search in the
foreign market, it does not a⁄ect the distribution of migrants by type since ￿ is common
to all workers regardless of their education attainment. We have 23 free parameters to3.4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE THEORY 61
match 23 targets. The targets are home labor market conditions as well as the wages in
the foreign labor market (14 match speci￿c wages), the observed assignment of workers
to jobs in the home labor market but not in the foreign labor market since this what we
are hoping our model will be able to predict (9 types of matches) observed in ELMPS
2012 to pin down the surplus in Egypt.
In the ￿rst part of our analysis, we do not target the employment rates abroad i.e.
migration rates in the case of temporary migration since we are interested in our model
predictions regarding the composition of migrant workers conditional on education and
legal status. It is important to note that targeting the wages in the foreign labor market
does not guarantee that our model will match the distribution of skills and legal status of
workers observed in the foreign labor market or even the assignment of workers to ￿rms
in the foreign market. In fact, since the surplus is higher for legal workers regardless of
their schooling attainment, and since undocumented high type workers face a zero hiring
probability at the white collar job, high skilled workers have no incentive not to choose
legal status. Positive legal status costs are necessary to yield worker expectations that
are consistent with a positive measure of undocumented worker job applicants, more so
for high skilled workers than for low skilled workers. Since high skilled workers who
choose to be undocumented only have access to blue collar jobs abroad (lower wages),
high skilled workers have an additional incentive to become documented workers. Since
high skilled workers have access to both types of jobs in their home country, high skilled
workers with a high propensity to become undocumented migrants (below threshold risk
aversion) may ￿nd themselves better o⁄ searching in the home labor market than to62CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
search for jobs as undocumented workers abroad. For low skilled workers, the analysis
is much simpler. In both markets they have a zero probability of working at the white
collar job restricting their employment opportunities in all markets.
We report the model predicted distribution of migrant workers by education and legal
status in a world free of visa costs. For the second part of our analysis, we use a minimum
distance estimation which assumes that the model is a true version of the world, adding
observed employment rates abroad to our list of data targets. We do so in order to
recover the legal status costs that are consistent with "observed migration". We compare
predicted migration with observed migration and we also report the probability that
migrant invests in new skills conditional on education and legal status. Our calibration
parameters are deferred to a table in the appendix.
Table 7: Job separation rates by education, legal status and occupation
E(h;d;f;w)￿ high educ. documented migrants at the white collar job 0.88
E(h;d;f;b) high educ. doc. migrants at the blue collar job 0.92
E(h;u;f;b) high educ. undocumented migrants at the blue collar job 0.93
E(l;d;f;b) low educ. doc. migrants at the blue collar job 0.91
E(l;u;f;b) low educ. undoc. migrant at the white collar job 0.933.4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE THEORY 63
The following table presents the results comparing model predictions with observed
migration ￿ ows.
Table 8: Predicted Migration vs Observed Migration
Results Model Data
Migration Rates* Predicted Migration Targeted Migration ELMPS (2012)
Less than HS (l) 3.4 % 3.4 % 3.4 %
HS and above (h) 4.3 % 4.3 % 4.3 %
Documentation choice - - -
(l) 100 % 63.9 63.9 %
(h) 100 % 77.4 77.4 %
Assignment of Workers to Jobs (Foreign Labor Market)
e(h;d;f;w)￿ ￿
E(h;d;f;w)
Total Employed 0.06 0.06 0.06
e(h;d;f;b)￿ =
E(h;d;f;b)
Total Employed 0.53 0.40 0.40
e(h;u;f;b)￿ =
E(h;u;f;b)
Total Employed 0 0.13 0.13
e(l;d;f;b)￿ =
E(l;d;f;b)
Total Employed 0.41 0.26 0.26
e(l;u;f;b)￿ =
E(l;u;f;b)
Total Employed 0 0.15 0.15
3.4.1 On the Job Investments
In this section, we compare the likelihood that migrants invest conditional on the job
separation rates, wages and employment rates observed in the ELMPS data. Table
9 reveals the likelihood that a migrant invests on the job conditional on the migrant￿ s64CHAPTER 3. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: THE SOURCE COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
education, legal status and occupation in the foreign labor market. The following table
presents the likelihood that a migrant invests in new skills conditional on education,
legal status and occupation.
Table 9: Investments
E(h;d;f;w) 0.51
E(h;d;f;b) 0.51
E(h;u;f;b) 0.41
E(l;d;f;b) 0.66
E(l;u;f;b) 0.65
From table 9, we learn that legal migrants are more likely to invest than illegal
migrants, however it is low skilled migrants who are more likely to invest on the job.
We also learn that the penalty for being undocumented is greater for high skilled workers
than for low skilled workers, which combined with legal status costs explain why more
high skilled workers choose the legal pathway than low skilled workers.
3.5 Discussion
Our results suggest that in a world free of legal status cost, all workers would choose
to become documented. This result seems to suggest that costly and selective visas
give rise to illegal sub-markets by decreasing the market returns for the legal pathway.
Our model suggests that positive visa costs reduce the gains from becoming documented
relative to staying undocumented. This is consistent with the surplus for legal work
decreasing relative to illegal work. The model reveals that legal status costs are 643.6. CONCLUSION 65
% lower for high skilled workers relative to low skilled workers in the case of Egyptian
temporary migration. In our model, increasing the probability of deportations increases
the likelihood that a migrant chooses the legal pathway, however those who migrate
illegally are less likely to invest in new skills.
3.6 Conclusion
Using our simple model we quantify the gains from legal migration conditional on work-
ers education and can therefore answer a number of questions regarding the e⁄ect of
migration costs on the migration decision and on the observed skill distribution of tem-
porary migrant workers. We ￿nd that visa costs deter legal migration relative to illegal
migration. Documented workers are more likely to invest in new skills than undocu-
mented workers, however it is low skilled workers who are more likely to invest than high
skilled. Investments are consistent with why the schooling wage gap is higher among
non-migrants than among returnees.
Our ￿ndings are also consistent with previous ￿ndings in this literature that indicate
that high skilled workers remit less (see Faini (2007), Schi⁄, Ozden and Niimi (2008) and
others). We leave the remittance issue for future research. In this model, we assumed
that return migrants re-enter the labor force as workers. A possible extension would
be to investigate the e⁄ects of entrepreneurship among return migrants who create new
jobs on the source country labor market and thus a⁄ecting the migration incentives in
the ￿rst place. We leave these topics for future research.Part I
References and Appendices
6667
REFERENCES
1. Acemoglu, Daron, and Robert Shimer (1999), ￿Holdup and e¢ ciency with search
frictions￿ , International Economic Review, 40, 827-849.
2. Aura, S. (2002). ￿Uncommitted Couples: Some E¢ ciency and Policy Implica-
tions of Marital Bargaining,￿ Working Papers 0217, Department of Economics,
University of Missouri.
3. Becker, Gary S (1981) A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press: Cam-
bridge.
4. Becker, Gary S. and Murphy (1992), "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs,
and Knowledge," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(4),
pages 1137-60, November.
5. Becker, G. (1973). "A theory of marriage: Part I", Journal of Political Economy,
81(4):813￿ 846.
6. Becker, G., E.Landes, R. Micheal (1977). "An Economic Analysis of Marital In-
stability", Journal of Political Economy, 85,1141-88
7. Becker, Gary S (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press:
Cambridge.
8. Bianchi, S. M, Subaiya, L. and Kahn, J.R (1999). " The Gender Gap in the
economic well-being of nonresident fathers and custodial mothers". Demography,
36 (2), 195-203.68
9. Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn (2000), ￿Gender Di⁄erences in Pay￿ ,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 75-99.
10. Booth Allison & Melvyn Coles, 2010. "Education, Matching, and the Allocative
Value of Romance," Journal of the European Economic Association, European
Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 744-775, 06.
11. Brinig, Margaret and Douglas W. Allen (2000). "These Boots Are Made for Walk-
ing: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women". American FormationLaw and Eco-
nomics Review 2 (1): 126￿ 129.)
12. Burdett, Kenneth, and Melvyn Coles (2002), ￿Transplants and Implants: The
Economics of Self Improvement￿ , International Economic Review, 42, 597￿ 616.
13. Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R., and
Wright, G., editors (2006). Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest
Times to the Present. Cambridge University Press, New York.
14. Chiappori, P., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002). ￿Marriage Market, Divorce Legis-
lation, and Household Labor Supply,￿Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37￿ 72.
15. Chiappori, Iyigun & Weiss (2005). "Spousal Matching, Marriage Contracts and
Property Division in Divorce"
16. Chiappori, Pierre-AndrØ & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram (2007)."Public Goods,
Transferable Utility and Divorce Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 2646, Institute for
the Study of Labor (IZA).69
17. Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2008). "An assignment model with Divorce and
Remarriage", IZA Discussion paper 3892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
18. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Murat Iyigun and Yoram Weiss (2009), ￿Investment in
Schooling and the Marriage Market￿ , American Economic Review, 99, 1689-1713.
19. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Bernard Salanie and Yoram Weiss (2010), "Partner choice
and the Marital College Premium", Discussion Papers 1011-04, Columbia Univer-
sity, Department of Economics.
20. Choo, Eugene and Aloysius Siow (2006), "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal
of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201,
February.
21. Clark, S. (1999). ￿Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution,￿Economic Journal,
109(454), C41￿ 54.
22. Dnes (1999). ￿Applications of Economic Analysis to Marital Law: Concerning a
Proposal to Reform the Discretionary Approach to the Division of Marital Assets
in England and Wales,￿International Review of Law and Economics, 19(4), 533 ￿
552.
23. Drewianka, Scott (2008). "Divorce Law and Family ". Journal of Population
Economics, 21 (2): 485-503.
24. Doepke Matthias and Michele Tertilt. 2009. ￿Women Liberation: What￿ s in It for
Men?.￿Quartely Journal of Economics, Vol. 124(4): 1541-1591.70
25. Fella Giulio, Paola Manzini, and Marco Mariotti. Does divorce law matter? Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association, 2(4):607￿ 633, 2004.
26. FernÆndez, Raquel & Guner, Nezih & Knowles, John (2001), "Love and Money: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," CEPR
Discussion Papers 3040.
27. Friedberg, L. (1998). "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from
Panel Data," American Economic Review, 88(3), 608-627.
28. Gould, Eric D. & Paserman, M. Daniele (2003),"Waiting for Mr. Right: rising
inequality and declining marriage rates," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier,
vol. 53(2), pages 257-281.
29. Greenwood, Jeremy, Ananth Seshadri, and Mehmet Yorukogu (2005) , ￿Engines
of Liberation￿Review of Economic Studies, 72, 109-133.
30. Gruber, J. (2004). "Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run
Implications of Unilateral Divorce," Journal of Labor Economics , Vol. 22 (4)
799-833
31. Guha Brishti (2010). Sex ratios, divorce laws and the marriage market. Paper no.
28, SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series.
32. Halla, M (2007). "Divorce and the excess burden of lawyers". IZA Discussion
Paper 296271
33. Ho⁄man, S.D. and Duncan, G.J. (1988). "What are the economic consequences of
divorce". Demography, 25 (4), 641-645.
34. Iyigun, Murat and Randall P. Walsh (2007), ￿Building the Family Nest: Premarital
Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations￿ , Review of Economic
Studies 74, 507-535.
35. Knowles, John A (2013), "Why are married men working so much?" Review of
Economic Studies.
36. Knowles J. and Kennes J. (2012). "Do Marital Prospects Dissuade Unmarried
Fertility?". University of Southampton, 54pp. (Centre for Population Change
Working Paper, 23).
37. Langlais, E., 2010. ￿On unilateral divorce and the ￿selection of marriages￿ hy-
pothesis￿ . Recherches Economiques de Louvain 76, 229￿ 256.
38. Matouschek, Niko and Imran, Rasul (2008). "The economics of the marriage
contract: Theories and Evidence", Journal of Law and Economics, 51-59-110.
39. Marcassa (2013). "Divorce Laws and Divorce Rate in the U.S.", The B.E. Journal
of Macroeconomics. Volume 13, Issue 1.
40. Masters, Adrian M (1998), "E¢ ciency of Investment in Human and Physical Cap-
ital in a Model of Bilateral Search and Bargaining," International Economic Re-
view, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University
Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, 39, 477-94.72
41. Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers 2012, "Directed Search Over The Lifecycle". 12-
002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University
of Pennsylvania.
42. Moen, Espen R (1997), ￿Competitive Search Equilibrium.￿ Journal of Political
Economy, 105, 385￿ 411.
43. Peters, H. Elizabeth (1986). ￿Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints
and Private Contracting.￿American Economic Review, 76(3): 437￿ 54.
44. Peters, H. Elizabeth (1992). ￿Marriage and Divorce: Reply.￿American Economic
Review, 82(3): 687￿ 93.
45. Peters, Michael and Aloysius Siow (2002), ￿Competing Pre-marital Investments￿ ,
Journal of Political Economy, 110, 592-608.
46. Rasul, Imran (2003). "The Impact of Divorce Laws on the Marriage Market".
Unpublished Manuscript.
47. Rasul, Imran (2006). "Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws". The Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1
48. Shi, Shouyong (2001), ￿Frictional Assignment. I. E¢ ciency.￿J. Econ. Theory, 98,
232￿ 60.
49. Shimer (2005), ￿The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordi-
nation Frictions.￿ Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113, pp. 996-1025.73
50. Stevenson, B. (2006). ￿The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Speci￿c Capital￿ ,
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 75-94.
51. Stevenson, B. and Wolfers, J. (2007). "Marriage and divorce: Changes and their
driving forces ",Journal of Economic Persectives, 21(2):27￿ 52.
52. Voena, A. (2013). " Yours, Mine and Ours: Do Divorce Laws A⁄ect the Intertem-
poral Behavior of Married Couples?". Unpublished Manuscript.
53. Weitzman, L. J. (1985). The Divorce Revolution. The Free Press, New York, NY.
54. Wolfers, J. (2006). "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Recon-
ciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, 96(5), 1802-1820.
55. Zvika Neeman & Andrew F. Newman & Claudia Olivetti (2008). "Are Career
Women Good for Marriage?," Boston University - Department of Economics - The
Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-167
56. Yurko, Anna (2012). "Costly Divorce and Marriage Rates". MPRA Paper 37810,
University Library of Munich, Germany.
57. Zagorsky, J.L (2005). "Marriage and divorce￿ s impact on wealth". Journal of
Sociology, 41(4), 406-424.
58. Antercol, H, D.A. Cobb-Clark and S.J. Trejo. 2003. "Immigration Policy and
the Skills of Immigrants to Australia, Canada and the United States," Journal of
Human Resources, XXXVIII(1), 192-218.74
59. Asha Abdel Rahim & Dany Jaimovich & Aleksi Yl￿nen. 2013. "Forced dis-
placement and behavioral change: An empirical study of returnee households in
the Nuba Mountains,"HiCN Working Papers 157, Households in Con￿ ict Net-
work.Cora Leonie Mezger Kveder, Marie-Laurence Flahaux. 2013. "Returning
to Dakar: A Mixed Methods Analysis of the Role of Migration Experience for
Occupational Status", World Development, Volume 45, Pages 223-238
60. Bianchi, M. 2013."Immigration policy and self selecting migrants", Journal of Pub-
lic Economic Theory 15(1), 1-23
61. Belot, M , and T. Hatton. 2012. "Immigrant selection in the OECD" Scandinavian
Jounal of Economics, 224 (4), 11205-1128
62. Bertoli,S and H. Bruckner. 2011. "Selective immigration policies, migrants educa-
tion and welfare at origin", Economics Letters, 113 (1), 19-22
63. Bertoli and Rapoport. 2013. "Heaven￿ s swing door: Endogenous skills, migration
networks and the e⁄ectiveness of quality-selective immigration policies". CReAM
Discussion Paper Series, 1330, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration
(CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
64. Bond, E and T. Chen . 1987. "The Welfare e⁄ects of illegal immigration". Journal
of International Economics, 23/3-4, 315-328.
65. Borjas, Freeman and Lang.1991. Undocumented Mexican-born workers in the
United States: How many, how permanent?. Immigration Trade and the Labor75
Market, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.
66. Chiswick B. 1988. "Illegal immigration and immigration control". Journal of
Economic Perspectives 2/3, 101-15.
67. De Vreyer P., Gubert F., Robilliard A.-S. 2008. ￿Return Migrants in Western
Africa : Characteristics and Labour Market Performance￿ .
68. Djajic, S. 1987. Illegal aliens, unemployment and immigration policy". Journal of
Development Economics, 25, 235-249
69. Djajic, S. 1999. "Dynamics of Immigration Control". Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, 12, 45-61.
70. Epstein G. Hillman and A. Weiss. 1999. "Creating illegal immigrants". Journal
of Population Economics 12/1. 3-21.
71. Ethier, W. 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The host-country problem". American
Economic Review, 76, 51-71.
72. Ghosh B.1999. ￿The promise and pitfalls of return migration￿ , Conference Re-
port - International Migration, Development and Integration, Ministry for Foreign
A⁄airs, Stockholm, p 189-205.
73. Bijwaard G. E. 2005. ￿Migration Dynamics of Immigrants: Who Leaves, Who
Returns and How Quick?￿ , Technical report, Econometric Institute, Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam, 38 p.76
74. Camarota, Steven A. 2004. The High Cost of Cheap Labor: Illegal Immigration
and the Federal Budget. Center for Immigration Studies
75. Card, David. 2005. ￿Is the New Immigration Really so Bad?￿NBER Working
Paper No. 11547.
76. Card, David and Ethan G. Lewis. ￿The Di⁄usion of Mexican Immigrants During
the 1990s: Explanations and Impacts.￿In George J. Borjas, ed., Mexican Immi-
gration to the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago and National Bureau
of Economic Research, forthcoming.
77. Cornelius, Wayne A. 2001. ￿Death at the Border: E¢ cacy and Unintended Conse-
quences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy.￿Population and Development Review,
Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 661￿ 85.
78. Cortes, Patricia. 2005. ￿The E⁄ect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices:
Evidence from CPI Data.￿Mimeo, MIT.
79. Docquier, Machado, Sekkat. 2012. "E¢ ciency Gains from Liberalizing Labor
Mobility". UCL Discussion Papers Series.
80. Hanson, Gordon H. 2005. "Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Fi-
nance and Political Opposition to Open Borders". Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics.
81. Hanson, Gordon H. 2006. ￿Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States.￿
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 869￿ 924.77
82. Hanson, Gordon H. and Antonio Spilimbergo. 1999. ￿Illegal Immigration, Bor-
der Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-
Mexico Border.￿American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp. 1337￿ 57.
83. Manon Domingues Dos Santos and Fabien Postel-Vinay. 2003. "Migration as a
Source of Growth: The Perspective of a Developing Country" Journal of Population
Economics , Vol. 16, No. 1 pp. 161-175
84. Mayr, K. S. Minter and T. Krieger. 2012. "Policies on illegal immigration in a
federation". Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42/1-2, 153-165.
85. McCormick B., Wahba J. 2001. ￿Overseas Work Experience, Savings and En-
trepreneurship Amongst Return Migrants to LDCs￿ , Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 48, n￿ 2, p. 164-178.
86. McCormick B., Wahba J. 2003, ￿Return International Migration and Geographical
Inequality: The Case of Egypt￿ . Journal of African Economies, vol. 12, n￿ 4, p.
500-532.
87. Wahba, Jackline & Zenou, Yves. 2012. "Out of sight, out of mind: Migration,
entrepreneurship and social capital," Regional Science and Urban Economics, El-
sevier, vol. 42(5), pages 890-903.78
.1 Appendix to Chapter 3.1. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 79
Table 10: Calibrated Parameters (non-targeted: migrant employment) ￿H = 0;￿L = 0
Jointly Calibrated to match Foreign Labor market targets (wages by education and occupation)
x(h;d;f;w) = 13:1 To match wages of high educ. doc. migrants at the white collar job
x(h;d;f;b) = 10:7 To match wages of high educ. doc. migrants at the blue collar job
x(h;u;f;b) = 10:3 To match wages of high educ. undoc. migrants at the blue collar job
x(l;d;f;b) = 12:1 To match wages of low educ. doc. migrants at the blue collar job
x(l;u;f;b) = 6:8 To match wages of low educ. undoc. migrant at the white collar job
Ah;d = 4:3 To match unemployment rate of high educ. workers
Ah;u = 3:6 To match unemployment rate of high educ. workers
Al;d = 6:4 To match unemployment rate of low educ workers
Al;u = 1:0 To match unemployment rate of low educ workers
Jointly calibrated to match home labor market targets (wages and employment rates)
x(h;h;w) = 2:4 To match wages of high educ. non migrant workers at the white collar job
x(h;h;b) = 2:2 To match wages of high educ. non migrant workers at the blue collar job
x(l;h;b) = 1:3 To match wages of low educ. non migrant workers at at the blue collar job
Jointly calibrated to match Return Migrant outcomes (wages and employment rates)
x(h;d;h;w) = 2:5 To match wages of high educ. documented migrants at the white collar job
x(h;d;h;b) = 2:1 To match wages of high educ. documented migrants at the blue collar job
x(h;u;h;w) = 2:2 To match wages of high educ. undocumented migrants at the white collar job
x(h;u;h;b) = 2:0 To match wages of high educ. undocumented migrants at the blue collar job
x(l;d;h;b) = 2:1 To match wages of low educ. documented migrants at the blue collar job
x(l;u;h;b) = 2:0 To match wages of low educ. undocumented migrant at the white collar job
Rh;d = 1:1 To match wages and unemployment rates of high educ. doc. migrants
Rh;u = 1:1 To match wages and unemployment rates of high educ. undoc. migrants
Rl;d = 1:1 To match wages and unemployment rates of low educ. doc. migrants
Rl;u = 1:1 To match wages and unemployment rates of low educ. undoc. migrants80
.1.1 Targeted Migration: ELMPS 2012
Table 11: Observed ELMPS(2012) Migration (Targeted: migrant employment)
￿ = 0:1 To match the mean migration rate: 3.85%
￿h;w = 0:41;￿f;w = 1:0 Mean of cost distribution: to match assignment of workers to jobs
￿H = 3:3 To match the fraction of workers who ￿nd jobs as documented workers
￿L = 5:1 To match the fraction of workers who ￿nd jobs as undocumented workers.1. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 81
.1.2 Comparative Statics
E⁄ect of an Increase in the Deportation rate on the Decisions of High Skilled
Temporary Workers82
Figure 1: E⁄ect of an Increase in the Deportation rate on Decisions of Low skilled
Temporary Workers